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Note
Enforcing the Speech Limit: Nixon v. Shrink

Missouri Government PAC
Dean N. Fugate*

I. INTRODUCTION

"On [the] list of the ten worst decisions of this century."' "[A]3
2
"[D]elusional."
20th-century stepchild to Dred Scott.",
4
"[Dlisastrous."
There is no shortage of criticism of Buckley v. Valeo,5 the Supreme
Court's landmark 1976 campaign financing decision. 6 Few Court
rulings are as widely reviled as Buckley, in which the Court interpreted
the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA").7 In the process, the
Court fundamentally altered both the First Amendment's protection of
political speech and the nation's political process. 8 Even Buckley's
supporters admit that the opinion is flawed. 9 Yet while there is wide
* J.D. expected January 2001.
1. Joel M. Gora, Buckley v. Valeo: A Landmark of PoliticalFreedom, 33 AKRON L. REV. 7, 7
(1999).
2. Scott Turow, The High Court's 20-Year-Old Mistake, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, § 4, at
15. The Supreme Court's infamous Dred Scott decision held unconstitutional a federal law
prohibiting slavery in specified territories and served as a catalyst to the Civil War. See Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (superceded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII).
3. Robert Samuelson, 'Reforming' Campaign Finance Restricts Speech, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11,
2000, § 1, at 25.
4. Time to Rethink Buckley v. Valeo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1998, at A28.
5. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
6. See id. at 58 (holding that Congressionally-imposed expenditure ceiling was an
unconstitutional restriction of First Amendment speech).
7. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (1994)).
8. See Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign
FinanceReform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1056-57 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Gora, supra note 1, at 18. Gora complains that Buckley has been unfairly
criticized and "even demonized" by academic and political commentators, but acknowledges that
the Buckley Court did not sufficiently examine less-restrictive alternatives to FECA's
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agreement that the campaign financing system created in Buckley is
10
problematic, there is little agreement on an acceptable solution.
Whereas free speech absolutists attack Buckley's approval of
contribution limits as an unconstitutional cap on the First Amendment,
other reformers lament that the Court, in striking FECA's spending
limits, did not go far enough to prevent the corruptive influence of
money on politics. In disputing Buckley's central holding that campaign
contributions are constitutionally different from campaign
expenditures, 1' the decision's critics have gravitated toward
diametrically opposed positions: one camp argues that political
contributions are speech and thus deserve the same level of
constitutional protection as political expenditures, while others contend
money is not speech and thus believe that campaign expenditures
12
should be regulated in the same manner as contributions.
By allowing the government to set limits on contributions to
candidates, the Buckley Court reduced the First Amendment's
protection of political speech, even as it acknowledged such speech lies
at the core of the First Amendment. 13 The Court's decision divorced
FECA's contribution limits from its spending caps and in the process
created the widely despised and much-criticized campaign finance
system in place today. 14
Next year marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of Buckley, which
would seem an appropriate milestone upon which to reassess the
viability of Buckley in light of its impact on our First Amendment
contribution limits. See id. at 18, 23-26.
10. Compare BILL F. CHAMBERLIN & CHARLENE J. BROWN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS 161
(1982) (arguing that the Buckley Court's invalidation of expenditure limits was "dubious and...
not consistent with the democracy principle"), with Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 255, 291 (1992) (contending that the contribution limits upheld by the Buckley
Court are "inconsistent with 'the marketplace of ideas"').
11. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-21 (holding that restrictions on contributions constitute a
"marginal" restriction on speech whereas limits on expenditures poses a "substantial" restriction).
12. Compare, e.g., Samuelson supra note 4 ("You can have effective contribution limits or
free speech - but not both."), with THOMAS L. TEDFORD, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES 257 (1985) (arguing that "the use of capital should (not] determine First Amendment
rights" (quoting Charles Rembar, For Sale: Freedom of Speech, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 1981, at
32)).
13. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 ("The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to
such political expression .... ").
14. See Jonathan Peterson, The Times Poll: Clinton Retains High Job Rating; Gore Image
Hurt, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1997, at Al (showing a poll indicating that 63% of respondents
believed that the country's campaign finance mechanism requires either "a fundamental
overhaul" or "major improvements"); see also infra Part II.C (discussing the Buckley Court's
treatment of FECA's contribution and expenditure limits).
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freedoms and its effects on the nation's political system. 15 The
Supreme Court recently received that opportunity in Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PoliticalAction Committee ("Shrink PAC 1II"),16
in which the Court upheld a state law limiting contributions to
candidates for state office as consistent with both Buckley and the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.1 7 In sustaining the state
law in a 6-3 decision, the Court reaffirmed Buckley's crucial distinction
between the nature of speech generated by political donations and
speech funded through direct expenditures. 18 Additionally, the Court in
Shrink PAC III illuminated Buckley as a beacon to guide further state
contribution limits 19 and signaled to state and local governments a high
20
level of judicial deference in review of contribution statutes.
This Note examines the Shrink PAC III decision and its likely impact
on First Amendment protections of free speech rights, and its related
effect on political process funding in a representative democracy. In
addition, this Note reviews the level of protection the First Amendment
has afforded political speech and gives a brief overview of the history of
campaign finance legislation. 2 1 Further, it examines the limits imposed
on political campaigns by FECA and the Buckley decision and the
results of that structure on America's public debate and electoral
campaigns. 22 This Note then discusses the Missouri contribution limits
at issue in Shrink PAC III and reviews the lower court rulings leading to
the Court's grant of certiorari.23 This Note then examines the rationale
behind the majority's opinion in Shrink PAC III as well as the
concurring and dissenting positions. 24 This Note next analyzes the
Court's decision in light of First Amendment jurisprudence and the
nation's experience with campaign financing since the Buckley decision

15. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21 (delineating the constitutional distinction between
contribution and expenditure speech).
16. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm., 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000) [hereinafter
Shrink PAC 11].
17.

Seeid.at909-10.

18. See id. at 903.
19. See id. at 901 (stating that Buckley is "authority for comparable state regulation").
20. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the lower standard of review applicable to speech
restrictions resulting from contribution limits).
21. See infra Part II.A (discussing First Amendment protection of political speech).
22. See infra Part 1I.B-D (discussing the FECA, the Buckley decision, and their effect on
political campaigns).
23. See infra Part III.A (discussing the Missouri contribution statute and the lower court
decisions interpreting same).
24. See infra Part 1II.B (discussing the rationale supporting the Shrink PAC lII majority
opinion).
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and further explains how the majority opinion failed to apply the
rigorous analysis demanded by the gravity of the issue. 25 Finally, this
Note discusses the probable deleterious effects of the Shrink PAC III on
individual speech rights and candidate competition and describes how
the decision will tend to increase the prevalent political apathy among
26
the public.
II. BACKGROUND
The Framers of the Constitution believed free speech, and
particularly free political speech, to be an essential component to
democratic governance. Consequently, they enshrined this ideal in the
First Amendment. 27 Accordingly, for much of American history,
political campaigns operated with no government oversight.28 Although
Congress acted to curb campaign finance abuses by corporate donors in
the early twentieth century, contributions to federal candidates by
individual citizens were left unregulated until passage of the 1974
FECA amendments. 29 The Supreme Court later upheld FECA's
contribution limits as compatible with the First Amendment. FECA
was touted as a means both to reduce the escalating costs of federal
campaigns and to restore public confidence in the integrity of the
electoral system. The ensuing decades, however, have witnessed
rapidly spiraling campaign spending, increasing exploitation of
loopholes by politicians seeking to evade contribution limits and
30
dwindling public participation in the nation's political process.
A. FirstAmendment Protection of PoliticalSpeech
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech." '3 1 Despite the seeming simplicity of
this command, its meaning and application is much disputed.3 2
25. See infra Part IV (discussing the limitations of the Shrink PAC III decision).
26. See infra Part V (discussing possible impact of Shrink PAC III).
27. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (discussing the First Amendment protection
of political speech and its interpretation by the Court).
28. See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text (discussing the recent move towards
government oversight of political campaigns).
29. See infra notes 50-65 and accompanying text (discussing FECA, the 1974 amendments,
and the subsequent constitutional challenge).
30. See infra notes 91-119 and accompanying text (examining post-Buckley political
campaigns).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32. See JOSEPH J. HEMMER, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2 (1986)
(discussing disparity of views regarding scope of Free Speech Clause); see also WILLIAM W.
VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 21 (1984) (noting the Supreme
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Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has struggled to articulate a
uniform, consistent approach in determining what constitutes speech
and the permissible level of government restrictions allowed upon that
speech.3 3 While recent decades have seen the Court expand the
protection conferred by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
to encompass a wide range of expression and conduct,3 4 its major
35
function is to safeguard political speech against legislative restraints.
Uninhibited political speech was highly valued by the Framers
36
because they believed it essential to a self-governing democracy.
Acknowledging this precept, the Supreme Court has traditionally
accorded political speech a maximum level of judicial protection,
37
especially when expressed in the electoral forum.

Court alone has addressed the free speech clause "several hundred times").
33. See HEMMER, supra note 32, at 9 (observing that the Supreme Court's interpretation and
application of free speech doctrine varies with the issue confronted, the historical backdrop and
the Justices' own predispositions). Recently, the Court's free speech analysis has trended toward
even less consistency than in the past, developing a plethora of individualized subcategories and
in the process erasing clear guidelines as to what types of government regulation of speech is
constitutionally permissible. See Nina Kraut, Speech: A Freedom in Search of One Rule, 12 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 177, 178 (1995).
34. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (plurality opinion) (holding
freedom of speech encompasses nude dancing); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)
(holding freedom of speech includes flag burning); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205 (1975) (holding freedom of speech protects projection of drive-in movies featuring nudity);
Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (holding freedom of speech protects wearing
military uniform).
35. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist
about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a
major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.");
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[F]reedom to think
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth."); Sunstein, supra note 10, at 291.
36. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960), reprinted in THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: A READER 101, 103 (John H. Garvey & Frederick Schauer eds., 1992) ("The
principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of selfgovernment ....
It is a deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be
decided by universal suffrage."); see also HEMMER, supra note 32, at 405 (discussing
Meiklejohn's belief that public expression, such as the utterance of a citizen who is intent upon
self-government, enjoyed the absolute protection of the First Amendment); Pierre J. Schlag, An
Attack on CatergoricalApproaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671, 692 (1983).
But not all forms of government require broad freedom of speech to function properly. See THE
FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER, supra, at 101. For some governmental models, such as
monarchies, e.g., Saudi Arabia, freedom of speech is unnecessary. See id.
37. See, e.g., Eu v. San Francicso County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)
("[T]he First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a
campaign for political office.") (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
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Still, the First Amendment's protection of political speech is far from
absolute. 38 While the Supreme Court has upheld legislative restrictions
on this fundamental form of expression, it has generally required the
government to clear the hurdle of "strict scrutiny" to do so. 39 Under the
strict scrutiny standard of review, a regulation which burdens
fundamental speech is presumed unconstitutional, a presumption that
can be overcome only if the government indicates both a sufficiently
compelling interest in restricting speech and a narrowly tailored solution
so that speech is not unnecessarily abridged. 4° Recent trends, however,
suggest that the Court is much more willing to defer to legislative
judgment in deciding what constitutes a compelling state interest and
41
what remedy is sufficient to address that interest.
For much of the nation's history, however, judicial review of
campaign finance legislation was unnecessary simply because there was
none to review. 42 Electoral campaigns were financed entirely by private
contributions without legislative interference. 4 3 In the late nineteenth
century the first contribution limits were enacted, but in general the
laws were poorly enforced. 4 The dawn of the twentieth century,
however, brought increased public concern over the "pernicious"
influence of large campaign contributions, particularly by
corporations. 45 In 1907, the Tillman Act prohibited corporate donations

38. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 32, at 23 (observing that First Amendment protection
varies with type of expression and government interest in curtailing it); see also United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973)
("Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute .... ").
39. A notable exception is limits on contributions and expenditures by corporations, where the
Supreme Court has taken a deferential posture towards legislative restrictions. See, e.g., Federal
Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210-11 (1982) (indicating the
Court's disinclination to apply strict scrutiny to FECA's ban on corporate campaign contributions
to political parties).
40. See, e.g., Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518
U.S. 604, 641 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (stating that
the "well established" formula for strict scrutiny requires both a compelling governmental interest
and legislative means narrowly tailored to serve that interest).
41. See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing the lower standard of review applicable to
speech restrictions resulting from contribution limits).
42. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1052 (pointing out that our nation survived for over one
hundred years with no campaign finance laws).
43. See id. at 1053. Campaign expenditures originally consisted of not much more than
pamphlet printing expenses and providing food and refreshments to voters at political rallies, a
practice particularly prevalent in the South. See id.
44. See id.
45. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1
(1976).
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to candidates for federal office; 46 a ban on labor union donations
followed in 1941. 47 It was not until the 1970's that Congress attempted
to extensively regulate both the inflow and outflow of money in
political campaigns. 48 As such, the current funding system that strictly
limits individual campaign contributions is a relatively recent
49
development in the nation's history.
B. FederalElection Campaign Act
The Federal Campaign Election Act of 1971 required disclosure of
campaign finances by candidates and imposed spending caps in an
attempt to control the rapidly spiraling cost of running for federal
office. 50 The Watergate scandal, as well as reports of questionable
fundraising practices during the 1972 campaign, however, induced
Congress to perform a quick and comprehensive legislative overhaul of
FECA.5 ' In 1974, Congress passed a series of sweeping amendments to
FECA that minutely regulated many aspects of the electoral funding
process.

52

Prompted by incidents of large cash donations to federal candidates
during the 1972 election cycle, 53 FECA's contribution limits were
46. See Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b
(1994)).
47. See Glenn J. Moramarco, Beyond "Magic Words": Using Self-Disclosure to Regulate
Electioneering,49 CATm. U. L. REV. 107, 110 (1999).
48. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (1994)).
49. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1052 (pointing out that our nation survived for over one
hundred years with no campaign finance laws).
50. See CHAMBERLIN & BROWN, supra note 10, at 161 (discussing congressional concerns
prompting 1974 FECA amendments); see also Daniel M. Yarmish, The ConstitutionalBasis for a
Ban on Soft Money, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1257, 1260 (1998) (discussing how FECA sought to
restrict rising campaign costs and strengthen campaign reporting requirements through spending
limits and strict public disclosure).
51. See Gora, supra note 1, at 14 (discussing how Congress was "stampeded" towards
strengthening FECA's reach); see also Smith, supra note 8, at 1055 (noting that the postWatergate Congress felt that it had to "do something").
52. Among the more significant provisions of FECA as amended were: providing for sharp
limits on both contributions and expenditures by individuals and groups, stricter reporting and
disclosure requirements, optional public financing of presidential elections, and the creation of
the Federal Election Commission to oversee it all. See Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of
2, 18, 26 U.S.C.).
53. In one prominent example, the dairy industry pledged $2 million to President Nixon's
1972 reelection campaign, for the purpose of obtaining a presidential audience to discuss raising
federal price supports. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd in
part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (finding governmental restriction on campaign expenditures
unconstitutional). The industry's ploy succeeded, and Nixon later reversed the decision of his
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designed to avoid the occurrence or appearance of quid pro quo
arrangements between contributors and candidates. 54 Individual
donations to a political candidate were limited to $1000 per candidate
per election, with a maximum donation limit of $25,000 in any election
cycle. 55 Additionally, advocacy group and political action committee
56
("PAC") contributions were capped at $5000 to a single candidate.
FECA's expenditure limits were more severe. 57 In primary
campaigns, spending by Senate candidates could not exceed the greater
of $100,000 or eight cents per state registered voter. 58 In general
elections, the spending limit was the greater of $150,000 or twelve cents
per registered voter.59 As for the House of Representatives, candidates
were restricted to a mere $70,000 in both the primary and general
elections, a figure that led some to refer to FECA as the "Incumbent
Protection Act." 60
The financing scheme enacted in FECA, however, was never fully
executed.6 1 Its constitutionality was immediately challenged in the
federal court for the District of Columbia by a variety of politicians and
political advocacy groups who claimed the law's funding and spending
limits directly infringed their First Amendment rights of freedom of
speech and association. 62 The district court certified the constitutional
Secretary of Agriculture and increased the dairy price supports. See id.
54. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976); see also Yarmish, supra note 50, at 126062. FECA defines a contribution as "any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or
anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal
office." 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (1994). FECA specifically excludes the value of a campaign
volunteer's time as a contribution. See id. § 431(8)(B)(i).
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2) (Supp. 1974) (repealed 1976). An election cycle includes both
a primary and general election.
56. See id. A political committee is defined as "any committee, club, association, or other
group of persons" receiving contributions or making expenditures in excess of $1,000 during a
calendar year. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (1994).
57. See Gora, supra note 1, at 15 (calling FECA's spending caps "unconscionably low").
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(1)(C) (Supp. 1974) (repealed 1976).
59. See id. § 608(c)(1)(D).
60. See Gora, supra note 1, at 15, 18 (observing that FECA's spending limits were so low as
to prevent effective challenges to incumbents). Gora termed the Act's expenditure limits
"cynical." See id. at 18. The annual value of the franking privilege (free postage) for members of
Congress itself exceeded $70,000 and was exempt from the spending calculations required of
current officeholders. See id. at 15, 18. As a result, under FECA's original parameters, House
incumbents were allowed to spend more on mailings to constituents than their challengers were
able to spend on their entire campaigns. See id. at 18.
61. See Moramarco, supra note 47, at 111.
62. See Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135, 137 (D. D.C. 1975), certified to en banc court,
519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (en banc), aff'd, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
Listed on the original suit filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia were
incumbent New York Senator James Buckley, the New York Civil Liberties Union, the
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issues to the appellate level, where the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld FECA's key provisions limiting both political
contributions and expenditures. 63 The plaintiffs' appeal to the Supreme
Court followed, asserting that the Court of Appeals' analysis of FECA
did not include the type of strict judicial scrutiny mandated by First
Amendment precedent. 64
C. The Buckley Compromise
Recognizing FECA's importance on the upcoming 1976 election, the
Supreme Court agreed to hear Buckley on an expedited basis, issuing its
lengthy opinion just three months after argument. 65 In its analysis of
the funding framework constructed in FECA, the Court began by
acknowledging that the challenged provisions restricted core First
Amendment speech. 66 It noted that the First Amendment is broadest in
its protection of political expression and recognized that money is an
unavoidable and indispensable method of disseminating political
information in a modem society. 67 Therefore, any restriction on the use
of money by political campaigns necessarily entails a corresponding
restriction on political speech.68
The Court, however, observed that the First Amendment's protection
of political activities is not absolute. 69 Rather, governmental
restrictions on political speech may be constitutionally valid, but the
Court stated that such laws must undergo "the closest scrutiny" to
70
survive challenge.
By applying strict scrutiny to FECA's provisions, the Court
concluded that FECA's limitations on expenditures were an
Libertarian Party, the Mississippi Republican Party, and the Committee for a Constitutional
Presidency - McCarthy '76, among others. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1976). The
named defendants included Secretary of the Senate Francis Valeo, as well as the U.S. Attorney
General, the U.S. Comptroller General and the FEC. See Buckley, 387 F. Supp. at 137.
63. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (en banc).
64. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 11.
65. See Alan B. Morrison, What If... Buckley Were Overturned?, 16 CONST. COMMENT.
347, 349 (1999).
66. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (stating that "[t]he Act's contribution and expenditure
limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities").
67. See id. at 19 (observing that "[v]irtually every means of communicating ideas in today's
mass society requires the expenditure of money").
68. See id.
69. See id. at 25; see also United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973) (holding that danger to government neutrality posed
by federal employees engaging in partisan political conduct was sufficient justification to restrict
employees' right of association).
70. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,460-61 (1958)).
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unconstitutional restriction of political speech. 7 1 According to the
Court, FECA's spending limits failed to survive strict scrutiny because
restrictions on expenditures during political campaigns would
72
necessarily reduce the size and scope of the nation's political debate.
Therefore, candidates' expenditures could not be limited without
placing a corresponding limitation on their quantity of speech, resulting
73
in an unconstitutional burden on political discourse.
In contrast, the Buckley Court upheld FECA's limits on contributions
74
by individuals and groups to candidates running for federal office.
The Court found the contribution limits constitutional because they both
served a compelling governmental interest and were narrowly tailored
75
to suit that interest.
To justify the different levels of First Amendment protection
accorded candidate expenditures and contributions, the Court
distinguished the mode of expression funded by each.7 6 The Court
observed that the use of contributions to fund political speech involves
speech by proxy, which occurs when a candidate speaks for a
contributor. 77 According to the Court, limiting the donations that fund
speech by proxy entails "only a marginal restriction" on a contributor's
78
freedom of speech and is, therefore, constitutionally permissible.
71. See id. at 47-48 ("[T]he independent expenditure ceiling.., fails to serve any substantial
governmental interest [but] heavily burdens core First Amendment expression."). The Buckley
Court stated that spending limits impose "substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on
the quantity and diversity of political speech." Id. at 19.
72. See id. (stating that spending restrictions on candidates would limit "the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached").
73. See id.
74. See id. at 20-21.
75. See id. at 29. Noting evidence of the recent campaign funding scandals tainting the 1972
election, the Buckley Court held that the government's interest in preventing corruption, whether
real or perceived, was sufficiently compelling to curb large campaign contributions. See id. at 2627. Moreover, the Court found that FECA's donative limits are narrow enough so as not to
unduly burden a contributor's free speech rights. See id. at 28-29.
76. See id.
77. The Court observed that "[w]hile contributions may result in political expression if spent
by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions
into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor." Id. at 21. The term
"speech by proxy" was coined by Justice Marshall in California Medical Ass'n v. Federal
Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he 'speech by proxy' that [a
contributor] seeks to achieve through its contributions ... is not the sort of political advocacy...
entitled to full First Amendment protection.").
78. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20. In the Court's view, larger contributions do not appreciably
increase the quantity of communication but FECA's $1000 contribution limit still allowed donors
to offer their candidates "a general expression of support." Id. The Court further explained that
while a contribution serves as symbolic support for a candidate, it "does not communicate the
underlying basis for the support." Id.
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Yet, while the Court upheld FECA's limits on contributions, it
invalidated FECA's limits on independent expenditures made by
citizens "relative to a clearly identified candidate." 79 Congress enacted
this provision to close a loophole that would allow third parties to
expend unlimited sums on behalf of a favored candidate, thereby
allowing candidates and contributors to avoid FECA's individual
contribution limits. 80 The provision's effect, however, would have been
to essentially end the use of paid political messages. by civic-minded
citizens, resulting in a radical curtailment of fundamental First
Amendment speech. 8 1 The Buckley plaintiffs challenged the language
82
of this section on both overbreadth and vagueness grounds.
In addressing these challenges, the Court agreed that the words
"relative to," if construed to include all issue-oriented expenditures,
would be unconstitutionally overbroad by infringing on the right of free
expression. 83 Similarly, because FECA did not define the term "relative
to," it lacked the certainty required to impose criminal penalties in "an
area permeated by First Amendment interests." 84 To solve the problem,
the Court distinguished between "issue advocacy" and "express
advocacy" when interpreting FECA's language. 85
Under this
construction, only expenditures that fund communications expressly
recommending the election or defeat of a specific candidate can be
constitutionally limited.86 Communications that avoid such express
language, however, are defined as "issue advocacy" and are not subject
to the Act's $1000 expenditure limit. 87 This distinction effectively
79. Id.
80. See Gora, supra note 1, at 15.
81. See id. ("[T]he loophole being closed was essentially the First Amendment itself ... .
82. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 40-41.
83. See id. at 43-44. The Court rejected the overbreadth claim as applied to contribution
limits, although it acknowledged that most contributions are not made for an illicit purpose. See
id. at 28-30. Instead, it noted the difficulty in "isolat[ing] suspect contributions" and stated that
FECA's limits were "focuse[d] ... on the ... narrow aspect of political association where the
actuality and potential for corruption have been identified ... ." Id. at 28-29.
84. See id. at 41-44.
85. See id. at 42-44. The Buckley Court created the expression "express advocacy" as a
constitutional term of art. See Moramarco, supra note 47, at 110-15 (discussing distinction
between express and issue advocacy).
86. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43-44.
87. See id. at 46-47. This section of the Buckley opinion gave rise to the so-called "magic
words" test, whereby the Court stated the expenditure limit of 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) would apply
only to communications containing words such as "vote for," "elect," "support," "defeat," "vote
against," etc. See id. at 44 n.52; see also Moramarco, supra note 47, at 113. However, a decade
after the Buckley decision, the Court determined that an advertisement may be construed as
express advocacy even without specific "magic words" urging election or defeat of a specific
candidate. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
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88
criminalizes the use of certain words in paid political advocacy.
Thus the Buckley Court bifurcated FECA's monetary limitations,
upholding FECA's contribution limits while striking its spending
limits. 89 Similarly, the Court divided FECA's independent expenditure
limit, permitting unlimited amounts to be spent on issue advocacy but
allowing Congress to regulate the amount a private citizen can spend in
90
coordination with a candidate.

D. Post-Buckley PoliticalCampaigns:Soft Money, Issue Ads, and
Local Regulation
Since the Buckley decision in 1976, the federal campaign contribution
limits have remained unchanged. 9 1 Meanwhile, periodic calls for
altering the way federal elections are financed have yet to produce any
substantive legislative result. 92 Many of these proposals would place
additional monetary restrictions on political advocacy and campaigns,
typically imposing spending limits on candidates or more restrictive
contribution limits on donors. 93 But, other reformers argue that such
methods suppress a large amount of essential political speech, thereby
94
violating the First Amendment.
The campaign finance environment has not remained static in the
years since Buckley. Rather, two trends have emerged in the ensuing

249-50 (1986) (holding that an advertisement that directs readers to vote for a particular class of
candidate, e.g. pro-life, also constitutes express advocacy).
88. See Moramarco, supra note 47, at 107-08.
89. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's review of FECA's
monetary limitations).
90. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court's distinction between
types of advocacy).
91. See 2 U.S.C § 441a(a) (1994).
92. See Sen. Russell D. Feingold, Representative Democracy versus Corporate Democracy:
How Soft Money Erodes the Principle of "One Person, One Vote," 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 377,
386 (1998); see also Kevin Deeley, Campaign Finance Reform, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 547, 547
(1999) (discussing Congress' failure to enact other reform proposals). Sen. Feingold (D-WI) was
a co-sponsor of the most recent attempt at campaign finance reform on Capitol Hill. The
McCain-Feingold Bill (co-sponsored by John McCain (R-AZ)) would have prohibited "soft
money" contributions from corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals to political parties. The
bill was defeated in the Senate in February 1999, despite claiming majority support among
senators, because McCain-Feingold supporters could not muster the 60 votes necessary to
overcome a threatened Republican filibuster. See Yarmish, supra note 50, at 1269, 1269 n.131.
For a discussion of soft money in the political process, see infra notes 97-107 and accompanying
text.
93. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1055 (noting that most reform proposals consist of either limits
on contributions, limits on total expenditures, public financing in lieu of private contributions, or
some combination of all three).
94. See, e.g., Gora, supra note 1, at 8; Smith, supra note 8, at 1080.
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decades: increasingly elaborate, even brazen, attempts by politicians
and political parties to exploit the loopholes in Buckley and its
progeny; 95 and a proliferation of state and municipal contribution laws
96
modeled after Buckley.
The most significant development in campaign financing in the last
decade has been the rapid rise of so-called "soft money" contributions
to political parties. 97 Such contributions are exempt from FECA limits
as long as they are used for a nonfederal election-related purpose 98 and
not used to directly influence the outcome of a particular federal
election. 99 Soft money contributions allow corporations, labor unions
and wealthy individuals otherwise subject to FECA's contribution limits
to give unlimited sums to political parties. 10 0 As such, political parties
have found an increasing number of methods to raise and spend soft
money.101
10 2
Buoyed by permissive Federal Election Commission regulations
and a Supreme Court decision forbidding limits on soft money
expenditures, 0 3 soft money is used extensively to fund political
95. See Moramarco, supra note 47, at 121 (discussing the increase of sham "issue advocacy"
that consist of thinly veiled attempts to influence the outcome of elections); see also Yarmish,
supra note 50, at 1257-58 (discussing soft money donations to the Democratic Party by Chinese
nationals).
96. See Deeley, supra note 92, at 548 (discussing increasing number of states enacting
campaign laws limiting contributions to candidates). Legislation capping campaign contributions
"has been enacted in several states by popular vote." Id.
97. The term "soft money" describes "'the unlimited funds raised by party committees that
cannot be used for the express purpose of influencing Federal elections, but may be used for a
wide array of activities that can indirectly benefit Federal candidates."' Yarmish, supra note 50,
at 1259 (quoting Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with the 1996
Federal Election Campaign - Part VIII: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Government
Affairs, 105th Cong. 128 (1997) (statement of Anthony Conado, Professor of Government, Colby
College)).
98. Examples of nonfederal election-related purposes originally included traditional "partybuilding activities" such as state voter registration and "get-out-the-vote" drives, as well as
administrative overhead. See id. at 1266-68.
99. See id. at 1266. Soft money was not a direct result of the Buckley opinion, but rather from
Federal Election Commission regulations adopted in 1978. See id. The FEC was responding to
the political parties' complaints regarding the post-Buckley lack of funding for "party-building
activities" that were ostensibly not directly related to the election of specific candidates. See id.
at 1266-67.
100. See id. at 1268. In contrast, "hard money" contributions, those given directly to
candidates, are considered as directly influencing federal elections and thus subject to FECA's
contribution limits. See id. at 1266.
101. See, e.g., Moramarco, supra note 47, at 109.
102. See Yarmish, supra note 50, at 1266-68 (describing liberalization of FEC policy
regarding permissible uses of soft money); see also supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text
(discussing benefits and use of soft money).
103. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518
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advertisements that technically qualify as party-building activities, but
are actually little more than thinly-veiled candidate endorsements or
attacks.104 Although soft money, and the communications funded by it,
cannot be used to directly influence electoral outcomes, in practice they
form a potent vehicle by which corporations and candidates can evade
10 5
FECA's contribution and independent expenditure limits.
Accordingly, soft money donations to political parties have skyrocketed
have
sixfold in the last eight years, 10 6 as the two major political parties
10 7
loophole.
financing
campaign
this
of
advantage
taken
increasingly
While soft money donations and the use of sham issue ads are on the
10 8
rise, citizen interest in the political process appears to be waning.
Voter turnout in the 1998 general election was just 36 percent, the
lowest figure since the wartime 1942 election.' 9 Further, the decline in
voting rates is mirrored by the declining membership of the two major
political parties. In some states, the number of registered independents
exceeds the membership in either the Republican and Democratic
parties. 110
There are other signs that FECA, or the version of it created in
Buckley, is not reducing the influence of money in politics or bolstering
U.S. 604, 608 (1996) (holding that expenditures by a political party made independently of a
particular candidate cannot be limited under Buckley).
104. See Moramarco, supra note 47, at 109 (arguing that the "clear intent" of FECA is
subverted by issue advocacy funded by soft money).
105. See Feingold, supra note 92, at 380 (discussing how soft money was used to fund
extensive amounts of television advertising during the 1996 election).
106. Soft money donations to the two major political parties totaled $86 million in the 199192 election cycle. See Mike Doming, Campaign Reform DeadAgain; GOP Senators Defeat Bid
to Ban 'Soft Money' Donations, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20, 1999, at Al. Four years later, during the
1995-96 election cycle, this amount had tripled, to $262 million. See id. Current estimates
regarding the 1999-2000 cycle predict soft money contributions exceeding $525 million. See
John M. Broder, McCain and Bradley Collect Big Money, But It Isn't Soft, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
1999, at A22. Among the largest corporate contributors of soft money are Citigroup (banking
and insurance), BellSouth (telecommunications), Microsoft (computer software), AT&T
(telecommunications) and Goldman Sachs (banking). See id.
107. See Yarmish, supra note 50, at 1259; see also Feingold, supra note 92, at 380-81 (listing
examples of significant sums of soft money raised by the Democratic and Republican parties).
108. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1057.
109. See The Appleseed Center for Electoral Reform and the Harvard Research Bureau, A
Model Act for the Democratization of Ballot Access, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 451, 451 (1999)
[hereinafter Appleseed].
110. See Mark Z. Barabak, N.H. Primary is Independents' Day, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, at
Al. In the politically important state of New Hampshire, almost 40% of registered voters are
independents, more than either major political party. See id. Among younger voters in America,
the lack of party affiliation is even greater, with some national studies placing the ratio of
independents at 60% among the generation born between 1961 and 1981. See Dennis McLellan,
New Kids in the Bloc, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 30, 1998, at E6.
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public confidence in the political process."' Campaign spending by
candidates for Congress jumped 347 percent from 1977 to 1992.112 The
number of PACs increased sevenfold between 1974 and 1995, while
PAC contributions to congressional candidates rose ninefold." 3
Meanwhile, public faith in the integrity of the electoral process has
plummeted in the last 30 years. 114 Further, incumbency rates in
Congress peaked at record highs in the 1984 and 1988 elections, prior to
115
a slight reduction in recent years.
While FECA has failed in its goal of reducing the cost of mounting a
federal electoral campaign and has not increased public confidence in
the political system, 116 the issue remains whether FECA's contribution
limits have reduced corruption, which was the primary rationale behind
its enactment. 117 As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Buckley, the
amount of corruption in government is unknowable. 118 Yet this
uncertainty in the correlation between campaign contributions and the
level of government corruption has not prevented states and municipal
governments from attempting to curtail contributions to local political
candidates. 119

111. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1050.
112. See id.
113. See id. Political action committees (PACs) donated $20.5 million to federal candidates
in 1976. See id. By 1994, federal PAC contributions had increased to $189 million. See id.
114. See id. at 1057. Smith observes that the "perceived crisis of confidence" in government
has grown since enactment of FECA's contribution limits, although FECA was intended to have
the opposite impact. See id. While not discounting other factors that may explain the public's
reaction, Smith suggests that the remedy may be worse than the disease. See id. Moreover, there
are indications that campaign finance laws, such as FECA and its state progeny, are responsible
for weakening the role of political parties, despite the essential and beneficial role such parties
play in the nation's political process and democracy in general. See James Bopp Jr., All
Contribution Limits Are Not Created Equal: New Hope in the Political Speech Wars, 49 CATH.
U. L. REv. 11, 22-23 (1999).
115. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1051.
116. Seeid.
117. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1976).
118. See id. at 27 (acknowledging that "the scope of such pernicious practices can never be
reliably ascertained .... ").
119. See Bopp, supra note 114, at 23 (discussing trend toward additional regulation despite
evidence that campaign-finance restrictions harm democracy); see also Crystal Carreon & Phil
Willon, Anaheim May Ease Campaign Limits, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1999, at BI (discussing
California cities' contribution limits); Yes on Boulder's 2D, DENV. POST, Oct. 25, 1999, at B1O
(editorial endorsing adoption of $100 contribution limit for Boulder, Colorado).
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III. DISCUSSION
Like many states, Missouri enacted its own version of campaign
finance restrictions patterned after Buckley. 120 In July 1994, the state
legislature passed a law imposing limits on contributions to candidates
for state office ranging from $250 to $1000, depending on the size of
the office.' 2 ' The law was due to take effect on January 1, 1995.122 In
November 1994, however, Missouri voters approved Proposition A, 123 a
ballot initiative that provided
for even lower contribution limits and
124
became law immediately.
A. Lower Court Decisions
After a district court upheld the Missouri ballot initiative as
consistent with Buckley, 125 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed. 126 Applying the strict scrutiny standard referred to by the
Court in Buckley, the Eighth Circuit invalidated Proposition A's
127
contribution limits as unconstitutionally abridging freedom of speech.
The court found that Proposition A's contribution limits were not
narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest of limiting the corruptive
influence of large campaign contributions. 128 The Eighth Circuit's

120. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.032 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
121. See id.
122. See Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm. v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 520 (8th Cir.
1998) [hereinafter Shrink PAC II], rev 'd, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000).
123. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.100 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000) (repealed by S.B. No. 16,
§ A, limits governed by § 130.032).
124. See Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 634 (8th Cir. 1995). Proposition A provided:
There shall be the following limitations on campaign contributions:
(1) No person or committee shall make a contribution to any one candidate or
candidate committee with an aggregate value in excess of:
(a) $100 per election cycle per candidate in districts with fewer than 100,000
residents[.]
(2) [sic] $200 per election cycle per candidate, other than statewide candidates, in
districts of 100,000 or more residents. For purposes of this section "statewide
candidates" refers to those candidates seeking election to the office of Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Auditor, Treasurer and Secretary of State.
(3) [sic] $300 per election cycle per statewide candidate.
Id. at 634 n. 1. At the time of passage, Proposition A's contribution limits were the lowest in the
nation. See id. at 644.
125. See Carver v. Nixon, 882 F. Supp. 901, 905 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (holding that
"stairstepping" of contribution limits in the ballot initiative indicated it was narrowly tailored),
rev'd, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995).
126. See Carver, 72 F.3d at 645.
127. See id.
128. See id. The Eight Circuit found that the contribution limits in Proposition A were "too
low to allow meaningful participation in protected political speech ....
See id. at 641 (quoting
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invalidation of Proposition A effectively resurrected the limits
contained in the 1994 legislative statute, which
had been rendered
29
dormant by the passage of the ballot initiative. 1
In 1998, Zev David Fredman, an outsider candidate, 130 campaigned
for the Republican nomination for the office of state auditor. 13 1 The
1994 Missouri law limited contributions to candidates for that position
to $1000, but because the statutory limits are indexed to the Consumer
Price Index, the contribution limit had increased to $1075.132
A
conservative advocacy group, Shrink Missouri Government Political
Action Committee ("Shrink PAC"), donated $1025 to Fredman's
campaign in 1997 and gave another $50 in 1998, thereby reaching the
maximum legal contribution limit. 133 Subsequently, Fredman was
34
defeated in the Republican primary election. 1
Both Fredman and Shrink PAC filed suit in federal district court,
alleging that the Missouri contribution limits infringed on their First
Amendment freedoms of speech and association. 135 On cross motions
for summary judgment, the district court upheld the state law as
36
constitutional under Buckley. 1
Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1365 (8th Cir. 1994)). Further, the court noted that because the
limits were imposed via ballot initiative, they need not be accorded the same deference as those
imposed by legislative action. See id. at 645. This was not the first time the Eighth Circuit had
invalidated a state contribution limit as unconstitutionally low. See Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d
1356 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1127 (1995). In Day v. Holahan, the Eighth Circuit
invalidated a Minnesota statute that limited contributions to political committees to $100. See id.
at 1366.
129. See Shrink PAC 11, 161 F.3d at 520. The Missouri statute provides in pertinent part:
[Tihe amount of contributions made by or accepted from any person other than the
candidate in any one election shall not exceed the following:
(1) To elect an individual to the office of governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of
state, state treasurer, state auditor or attorney general, one thousand dollars;
(2) To elect an individual to the office of state senator, five hundred dollars;
(3) To elect an individual to the office of state representative, two hundred fifty dollars.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.032.1(1)-(3) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
130. Fredman, age 36, was a first-time candidate with no previous political experience or
party support. During his campaign, Fredman, a certified public accountant, worked as chief
financial officer for Fredman Brothers Furniture Company. See Jo Mannies, Appeals Court was
Big Plusfor GOP Challengerin Race for Auditor, ST. LOUTS POST-DISPATCH, July 26, 1998, at
B5.
131. See Shrink PAC I, 120 S. Ct. 897, 902 (2000).
132. See Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm. v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734, 737 (E.D.
Mo. 1998) [hereinafter Shrink PAC I], rev'd, 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 897
(2000).
133. See Shrink Pac 11, 161 F.3d at 520.
134. See Shrink Pac 1. 5 F. Supp. 2d at 737.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 742. In its analysis, the district court examined both the sufficiency of the
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed. 137 Noting that the
contribution limits regulated First Amendment rights, the appellate
court relied on Buckley in applying a strict scrutiny standard of review,
the same standard it had used to strike down Proposition A three years
earlier. 138 To satisfy strict scrutiny, Missouri was required to show that
it had both a compelling interest in imposing contribution limits and that
139
the limits were narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
The Eighth Circuit held that Missouri did not indicate a compelling
interest in support of its law.1 40 The state argued that its compelling
interest was the prevention of corruption, or the perception thereof, that
accompanied large campaign contributions to candidates running for
elective office. 14 1 The court, however, faulted the state for failing to
introduce empirical evidence indicating a connection between large
campaign contributions and any actual or apparent corruption. 142 The
court emphasized that Missouri had failed to show that any large
monetary donations were even made to candidates before passage of the
state statute limiting them. 143 As such, the court invalidated the
contribution limits as a matter of law. 144
Moreover, Judge Bowman, writing the second part of the Shrink PAC
II opinion without a majority, opined that even if evidence of a
compelling interest were forthcoming, the state had failed to show that

state's interest and the narrowness of its solution, the $1000 contribution limit. See id. at 737-42.
The court found the state's interest in preventing corruption compelling even without empirical
evidence supporting the state's contention that apparent or actual corruption is a problem in
Missouri, stating that "[tihe Court does not believe that polling the citizenry is required in order
to demonstrate that the integrity of a state's election process in facing a perceived threat." Id. at
738. As to the issue of whether the state's chosen limits were overly restrictive, the Court took
notice that the median household income in Missouri in 1995 was just over $31,000. See id. at
742. It therefore concluded that the average Missourian would consider a $1,000 contribution as
"large." See id.
137. See Shrink PAC 11, 161 F.3d at 523.
138. See id. at 521; see also Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 637 (8th Cir. 1995) (invalidating
voter-approved ballot initiative providing for contribution limits of between $100 to $300 as
overly restrictive of freedom of speech).
139. See Shrink PAC H, 161 F.3d at 521.
140. See id. at 522.
141. See id. at 521.
142. See id. at 522.
143. See id. The state did introduce an affidavit of a state senator who at the time co-chaired
the state's campaign finance reform committee, in which the senator claimed that it was his and
his colleagues' belief that large contributions had the "real potential to buy votes" and "have the
appearance of buying votes." See id. Noting that the senator's committee had designed the
legislation at issue and thus had a vested interest in seeing it sustained, Chief Judge Bowman
dismissed these statements as "conclusory and self-serving." See id.
144. See id.
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the statutory limits were narrowly tailored to that interest. 145 Using
FECA's $1000 limit as a benchmark, Judge Bowman noted that the
state's contribution limits, adjusted for inflation, severely curtailed
political speech by preventing candidates "from amassing the resources
14 6
necessary for effective advocacy."'
B. Shrink PAC III
The Supreme Court granted certiorari for Shrink PAC III to reconcile
the Eighth Circuit's decision in Shrink PAC H with its own precedent,
recognizing the issue's importance to the many states that had enacted
campaign finance legislation based on the Buckley opinion. 147 In a 6-3
vote, 148 the Court overruled the Eighth Circuit, upholding the Missouri
contribution limits and reaffirming Buckley. 149 As a result, state and
local governments can continue to confidently model their own
campaign finance laws after Buckley, regardless of inflationary erosion
of the dollar.' 50 In reiterating the constitutional distinction between
expenditures and contributions in the realm of political speech, the
Court again relied on the speech by proxy rationale that undergirded
51
Buckley. 1
Two dissenting opinions, however, strongly disagreed with the
majority holding and called for the overruling of Buckley.152 Justice
Kennedy accused the majority of ignoring the unfortunate consequences
of Buckley on political discourse, 153 while Justice Thomas, joined by

145. See id.
146. See id. at 522-23 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)). The court noted
that $1075 was the equivalent of $378 in 1976 dollars. See id. at 523 n. 4. The Buckley Court
held that contribution limits may be unconstitutional if set at levels that prevented candidate
speech from being heard. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).
147. See Shrink PAC III, 120 S. Ct 897, 903 (2000).
148. Comprising the majority were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id. at 901. Justice Breyer wrote a concurrence that was joined
by Justice Ginsburg. See id. at 910-14 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also filed a
concurring opinion. See id.at 910 (Stevens, J., concurring). The three-justice minority consisted
of Justice Kennedy, who filed a dissenting opinion, and Justice Thomas, who wrote a dissenting
opinion that was joined by Justice Scalia. See id. at 914-16 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), 916-27
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
149. Seeid.at910.
150. See id. at 901.
151. See id. at 903-04; see also supra Part IL.C (discussing the constitutional distinction
between campaign expenditures and contributions drawn by the Buckley Court).
152. See Shrink Pac I11,
120 S. Ct. at 914-16 (Kennedy, J.,dissenting), 916-27 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
153. See id. at 914 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia, attacked both the reasoning and use of precedent in the
54
majority opinion.'
1. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, written by Justice Souter, addressed two
issues: whether Buckley provided authority for state limits on
contributions to candidates, and whether the $1000 limit approved in
Buckley had eroded to an unconstitutionally low level. 155 The Court
acknowledged the ambiguity regarding the standard of review employed
by the Buckley Court in its analysis of FECA's contribution limits, but
declined to further clarify the standard in the current matter.1 56 Instead,
the majority in Shrink PAC III simply parroted Buckley's classification
of contributions as indirect speech and thus concluded it deserved less
First Amendment protection than expenditures.157 The majority quoted
at length the Buckley passage setting forth the rationale:
[A] limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may
contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal
restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free
communication. A contribution serves as a general expression of
support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the
underlying basis for the support. The quantity of communication by
the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his
contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated
symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution
provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's
support for the candidate. A limitation on the amount of money a
person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus
involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it
permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a
contribution but does not in any way158infringe the contributor's
freedom to discuss candidates and issues.
As to the justification necessary to impose such a restriction, the
Court reiterated the rationale advanced in Buckley regarding the
government's legitimate interest in preventing corruption. 159 Beyond

154. See id. at 916 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
155. See id. at 901.
156. See id. at 903 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976)). The majority did not
elucidate the applicable standard of scrutiny for examining contribution limits, stating that
"[p]recision about the relative rigor of the standard to review contribution limits was not a
pretense of the Buckley per curiam opinion." Id.
157. See id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-21).
158. Id. at 903-04 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21).
159. See id. at 906 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27).
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outright quid pro quo bribery, it noted that both the integrity of a
representative democracy and the public confidence necessary for its
operation is threatened by actual or perceived corruption.' 60 The
majority found that this threat extends to large political contributions
that could lead to candidates who are more easily swayed16by
their
1
benefactors and not sufficiently responsive to their constituents.
Fredman and Shrink PAC objected to the lack of empirical evidence
upholding the state's legitimate interest. 162 Refusing to strike the statute
for lack of evidentiary support, the Court alluded to the incidents of
financing irregularities that occurred during the 1972 campaign as
indicating that the connection between corruption and campaign
contributions is more than theoretical. 163 The majority also referred to
an affidavit by a state senator 1 64 and newspaper reports of large
contributions among state officials to determine that the State had met
its burden. 165 Additionally, the approval of Proposition A, the Missouri
ballot initiative that set contribution limits lower than the state statute,
was also relevant. 166 The majority viewed that referendum as indicative
of a widespread public perception that political contributions lead to
corruption. 167

160. See id. at 905-06 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27).
161. See id. at 906 ("Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the cynical
assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part
in democratic governance.").
162. See id.
163. See id. (observing that "the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election
demonstrate that the problem [of corruption] is not an illusory one") (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 27). Interestingly, in the opinion below, the Eighth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion:
"[W]e are unwilling to extrapolate from [Buckley's] examples that in Missouri at this time there is
corruption or a perception of corruption from 'large' campaign contributions, without some
evidence that such problems really exist." Shrink PAC 11, 161 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1998),
rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000).
164. See Shrink PAC 111, 120 S. Ct. at 907; see also supra note 138 and accompanying text
(applying a strict scrutiny standard of review, the Eighth Circuit noted contribution limits
regulated First Amendment rights).
165. See Shrink PAC 111, 120 S. Ct. at 907. The district court cited a report that a Republican
candidate for State Auditor in 1994 received $40,000 from a state brewery and $20,000 from a
bank. See Shrink PAC 1, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734, 738 n.6 (E.D. Mo. 1998), rev'd, 161 F.3d 519 (8th
Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000).
166. See Shrink PAC I1, 120 S. Ct. at 908; see also supra notes 137-46 and accompanying
text (discussing Eighth Circuit's invalidation of Proposition A's contribution limits).
167. See Shrink PAC 111, 120 S. Ct. at 908. The Court stated that "although majority votes do
not, as such, defeat First Amendment protections, the statewide vote on Proposition A certainly
attests to the perception [that] the voters of Missouri determined that contribution limits are
necessary to combat corruption and the appearance thereof." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that other Supreme
Court rulings since Buckley, notably Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Commission vs. Federal Election Commission,168 require the
government to prove that the alleged harm from candidate contributions
is based in fact and not mere conjecture. 169 The Court explained that
Colorado Republican did not raise the evidentiary bar for states
attempting to justify contribution limits and therefore excused Missouri
from any requirement to produce empirical evidence in support of its
contribution statute.1 70 The Court reasoned that, in light of the incidents
of financing irregularities cited in Buckley, Missouri's sparse
17 1
evidentiary showing was adequate to justify its contribution statute.
The Court indicated, however, that had the petitioners presented more
evidence contradicting the anecdotal examples of corruption in Buckley
172
and Shrink PAC I, Missouri's burden of proof may have been higher.
The Court discounted the petitioners' academic studies indicating that
large campaign contributions do not alter politicians' positions or votes
and concluded that large political contributions still pose a significant
73
risk of corruption. 1
The Court also disagreed with petitioners' contention that the
Missouri contribution law was not narrowly tailored to serve the state's
interest in preventing corruption.174 While candidate Fredman argued
that the state limits had prevented him from raising the funds necessary
to wage an effective campaign for State Auditor, the Court stated that
the inability of any single candidate to garner sufficient political

168. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S.
604 (1996).
169. See Shrink PAC 111, 120 S. Ct. at 906-07.
170. See id. at 907. Although the Court in Colorado Republican charged the federal
government with failing to show that the risk of corruption was real, the Court distinguished that
case on the basis that it dealt with limitations on independent expenditures, which are not directly
related to the government's interest in preventing corruption as are limitations on contributions.
See id. The majority indicated that the petitioners had misread Colorado Republican to require a
higher burden of proof than was accepted in Buckley, stating instead that both cases stood for the
proposition that expenditures enjoy a higher level of constitutional protection and thus a higher
evidentiary standard is required to sustain spending limits. See id. ("ColoradoRepublican ...
goes hand in hand with Buckley, not toe to toe.").
171. See id. at 906.
172. See id. at 908; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20 (1975); Shrink PAC 1, 5 F.
Supp. 2d 735, 738 n.6 (E.D. Mo. 1998), rev'd, 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 897
(2000).
173. See Shrink PAC 111, 120 S. Ct. at 908 (noting both the conflicting conclusions among the
reports and the lack of any indication that the studies had assuaged public suspicions regarding
the corruptive influence of political donations).
174. See id. at 908.
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donations under the state contribution statute did not render the law
constitutionally defective. 175 Observing that the contribution law
seemed to have little effect on the ability of candidates considered as a
whole to finance political campaigns, the majority referred to the district
court's finding that the Missouri statute still allowed politicians to raise
adequate funding for elective campaigns.1 76 Therefore, the Court
concluded that because the law had not reduced the overall availability
77
of such funds, it did not overly restrict the speech of all candidates. 1
Furthermore, the Court also rejected petitioners' claim that
178
Missouri's contribution limits were set unconstitutionally low.
Noting that since 1976 inflation has eroded the value of the dollar by
79
almost two-thirds, the petitioners argued that the state's limits
180
differed dramatically from the federal limits approved in Buckley.
The majority rebutted this argument by observing that the
constitutionality of contribution limits are not tied to a specific dollar
amount. 181
Instead, the Court stated that the test to determine the
constitutionality of a particular contribution limit is its effect on
political advocacy by both candidates and contributors. 182 The Court
175. See id. at 909 (stating that "a showing of one affected individual does not point up a
system of suppressed political advocacy that would be unconstitutional under Buckley").
176. See id. (quoting Shrink PAC 1, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 741) (noting that the Missouri law did not
prevent other candidates from "[amassing] impressive campaign war chests"). The district court
found that after the state limits took effect, there was little, if any, effect on the ability of
candidates to raise the funds necessary to wage a political campaign. See Shrink PAC 1, 5 F.
Supp. 2d at 740. Additionally, the district court found that in the 1994 pre-limit state elections,
almost 98 percent of political contributions to candidates for State Auditor were under $2000.
See id. at 741.
177. See ShrinkPACI!I, 120 S. Ct. at 909.
178. See id.
179. Missouri's contribution limits range from $250 to $1000. See generally MO. REV. STAT.
§ 130.032 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
180. See id. The Buckley Court suggested that some contribution limits may be
unconstitutionally low if they constitute a difference in kind from FECA's limits rather than
merely a difference in form. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976).
181, See Shrink PAC 111, 120 S. Ct. at 909 ("[T]he dictates of the First Amendment are not
mere functions of the Consumer Price Index." (quoting Shrink PAC H, 161 F.3d 519, 525 (1998)
(Gibson, J., dissenting))). The majority's disinclination to judge the sufficiency of the limits
chosen by the legislature mirrored the approach of the Buckley Court, which stated that "[i]f it is
satisfied that some limit on contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether,
say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000." See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30 (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
182. See Shrink PAC 111, 120 S. Ct. at 909 (stating that the test of constitutionality of
contribution limits is "whether the contribution limitation was so radical in effect as to render
political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice,
and render contributions pointless").
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concluded that the relevant question in any contribution limitation
challenge is not the relative value of the dollar, but the limit's effect in
reducing the entire amount of money contributed to all candidates in a
campaign. 183 Under this standard, the Court declared that the Missouri
limits did not impose an unconstitutional
restriction of the free speech
184
rights of candidates or their contributors.
2. Concurring Opinions
a. Justice Stevens' Concurrence
Justices Stevens and Breyer each filed concurring opinions in Shrink
PAC 111.185 The Stevens concurrence justified the Court's treatment of
contributions as constitutionally different from expenditures by
observing that the use of money to fund speech by others is a property
right rather than a fully protected speech right. 186
As such,
contributions used to promote ideas are not entitled to the same
protection as the ideas themselves. 187 Justice Stevens concluded that
speech by proxy funded by political donations deserves "significant
constitutional protection" but is not entitled to the same level of
88
deference afforded to individual speech.1
b. Justice Breyer's Concurrence
Justice Breyer, in a concurrence joined by Justice Ginsburg, defended
the standard of review utilized by the majority in sustaining the
Missouri statute. 189 Responding to the dissenters' complaints that the
majority abandoned the strict scrutiny standard traditionally employed
to review government restrictions on freedom of speech, Justice Breyer
advised against oversimplifying the complex constitutional issue posed
by contribution limits. 19° In Justice Breyer's view, the legitimate
interests involved on both sides of the contribution limit debate caution
against the strong presumption of unconstitutionality placed on statutes
183. See id.
184. See id. at 910.
185. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring), 910-14 (Breyer, J., concurring).
186. See id. at 910 (Stevens, J., concurring).
187. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
188. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
189. See id. at 911 (Breyer, J., concurring).
190. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that "mechanical application of the tests
associated with 'strict scrutiny' ... will properly resolve the difficult constitutional problem that
campaign finance statutes pose"); see also THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER, supra note 36, at
181 (arguing that "balancing is and must be the Court's methodology in all First Amendment
cases").
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by the strict scrutiny test. 19 1 Instead, Justice Breyer argued that courts
should approach statutory contribution limits by balancing the
individual contributor's right to free political speech and the state's
competing interest in preventing192corruption and maintaining public
confidence in the political system.
Justice Breyer concluded that the state's solution was not a
disproportionate burden on free speech. Although the state's limits may
have crippled Zev David Fredman's election chances, the law was not
93
unconstitutionally restrictive. 1
3. The Dissenting Opinions
The Shrink PAC III decision contained two dissenting opinions
written by Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Each Justice strongly
objected to the majority's decision and urged that Buckley be
overturned. The opinions differed, however, in their analysis of
94
Buckley's flaws and their proposed solutions. 1
a. Justice Kennedy's Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy accused the majority of shirking its
duty to acknowledge both the negative consequences of Buckley and the
Court's subsequent decisions regarding the electoral process and
political speech. 195 He further criticized the Court for abruptly
dismissing the petitioners' challenge to the state's law merely because
96
of the claim's factual similarity to Buckley. 1
Justice Kennedy believed the Buckley decision distorted First
197
Amendment speech rights by driving political speech "underground."'
He observed that the Buckley Court's endorsement of contribution limits

191. See Shrink PAC 11, 120 S. Ct. at 910 (Breyer, J., concurring).
192. See id. at 912 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[Wihere a law significantly implicates competing
constitutionally protected interests in complex ways[,] the Court has closely scrutinized the
statute's impact on those interests but refrained from employing a simple test that effectively
presumes unconstitutionality. Rather, it has balanced interests."); see also THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: A READER, supra note 36, at 181 ("[Flree speech doctrine is always the result of a
complex balancing process."). But see Sunstein, supra note 10, at 259-60 ("[A]ny restrictions on
speech, once permitted, have a sinister and inevitable tendency to expand .... As far as possible,
'balancing' ought to play no role in free speech law.").
193. See Shrink PAC II, 120 S. Ct. at 910 (Breyer, J., concurring).
194. See id. at 914-16 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), 916-27 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
195. See id. at 914 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
196. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
197. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[A]s contributors and candidates devise ever more
elaborate methods of avoiding contribution limits .... [t]he preferred method has been to conceal
the real purpose of the speech.").
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to individual candidates and its rejection of limits on donations gave rise
to the funding of issue advocacy by unrestricted "soft money"
contributions. 198 By contrast, "hard money" contributions donated to
fund direct candidate speech are capped and subjected to strict
disclosure laws. 199 Therefore, Justice Kennedy concluded that Buckley
created a system where clandestine speech is encouraged while candid
speech is penalized.2 °° In Justice Kennedy's view, such a result cannot
be compatible with the free speech guarantee of the First
20 1
Amendment.
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy also warned that Buckley's harmful
effects on political speech are compounded by the self-insulating nature
of the opinion. 20 2 Moreover, Justice Kennedy argued that the current
financing system undermined voter confidence in the integrity of the
electoral process. 20 3 Preservation of the public's faith in politics was
one of the primary reasons cited by the Buckley Court in upholding
FECA's contribution limits. 20 4 To bolster the integrity of political
funding, Justice Kennedy advocated the use of the Internet's
instantaneous communication capabilities to create a more immediate
and less restrictive method by which to monitor political contributions,
giving voters direct access to the information necessary to determine
20 5
when a candidate has been compromised or "bought."
198. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy lamented that the nation's campaign
finance framework is the result of Supreme Court decisions rather than pure legislative action:
"The current system would be unfortunate, and suspect under the First Amendment, had it
evolved from a deliberate choice; but its unhappy origins are in our earlier decree in Buckley,
which... created a misshapen system." Id. at 914-15 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
199. See id. at 914 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
200. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
201. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion "mocks the First
Amendment").
202. See id. at 915 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (observing that "outsider" candidates such as
Fredman "cannot challenge the status quo unless he first gives into it.").
203. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy went on to state that the "[riulings of
this Court must never be viewed with more caution than when they provide immunity from their
own correction in the political process and in the forum of unrestrained speech." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
204. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Voter participation rates in recent elections have
dipped to historical lows. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (explaining that voter
turnout in the 1998 election was the lowest figure since 1942).
205. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that "[a]mong the facts the Court declines to
take into account is the emergence of cyberspace communication by which political contributions
can be reported almost simultaneously with payment."). The Buckley Court stated that
"disclosure requirements - certainly in most applications - appear to be the least restrictive means
of curbing the evils of... corruption." See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976). But the
Court went on to state that:
Congress was surely entitled to conclude that disclosure was only a partial measure,
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Although Justice Kennedy would overrule Buckley, he stopped short
of declaring all statutory contribution limits as per se
unconstitutional.2 °6 Instead, Justice Kennedy left open the possibility
that some future legislative schemes limiting political contributions
20 7
might survive the strict scrutiny demanded by the First Amendment.
b. Justice Thomas' Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,
argued that the Missouri statute was an impermissible abridgment of
contributors' and candidates' speech and recommended that Buckley be
overruled.20 8 Justice Thomas accused the majority of abandoning the
principles underlying the First Amendment's free speech guarantee and
2 °9
failing to apply the strict scrutiny demanded by precedent.
Noting that robust and open political debate is the primary purpose
behind the First Amendment's free speech guarantee, 2 10 Justice Thomas
stated that campaign contributions produce "essential political
speech." 21 1 Thus, contribution limits are a "direct and substantial"
restriction on the political speech rights of both contributors and
candidates. 2 12 Accordingly, any restriction placing such substantial
burdens on speech protected at the core of the First Amendment
necessitates a presumption of unconstitutionality and should receive the
213
strictest scrutiny.
However, Justice Thomas claimed the majority applied a lesser,
unidentified standard of review to uphold the Missouri law. In Justice
Thomas' view, the standard employed by the majority relied on a
"faulty distinction," namely the speech by proxy rationale advanced in
Buckley that created a constitutional difference between speech funded

and that contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the
reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a system permitting unlimited financial
contributions, even when the identities of the contributors and the amounts of their
contributions are fully disclosed.
Id. at 28.
206. See Shrink PAC 111,
120 S. Ct. at 916 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[Although] [tlhere are
serious constitutional questions to be confronted in enacting any such scheme... I would not
foreclose it at the outset.").
207. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
208. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
209. See id. at 917 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
210. See id. at 916 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I begin with a proposition that ought to be
unassailable: [p]olitical speech is the primary object of First Amendment protection.").
211. See id. at 917 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
212. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
213. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).

232
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by contributions and speech funded by direct expenditure. 2 14 Justice
Thomas contended that this speech by proxy distinction fails because
nearly all political messages require dissemination through a third party,
regardless of how funded.2 15 Therefore, Justice Thomas concluded
there was no constitutional basis for treating contributions as
fundamentally different from expenditures and, thus,2 16no reason to deny
contribution speech full First Amendment protection.
After assailing the speech by proxy rationale, Justice Thomas focused
on contribution statutes' deleterious effect on the speech rights of both
contributors and candidates. 2 17 Justice Thomas maintained that the First
Amendment does not allow the government to judge the means used by
citizens to express their political viewpoints, nor the amount of money
they choose to spend doing so. 2 18 Instead, Justice Thomas contended
that in amplifying a candidate's message, contributors are simply
and effective
recognizing that political campaigns are a convenient
2 19
means of expressing the contributor's political ideas.
By ignoring the unique position of candidate organizations in the
political process as vehicles for citizen debate, Justice Thomas argued
the majority's ruling denied contributors the freedom to choose the

214. See id. at 218 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21
(1976). The Buckley Court held that while expenditure limits have a "substantial" effect on the
quantity of political speech whereas limits on contributions result in only a "marginal" restraint
on speech, in part because "the transformation of contributions into political debate involves
someone other than the contributor." See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
215. See Shrink PAC 1II, 120 S. Ct. at 918 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas observed
that "there is usually some go-between that facilitates the dissemination of the spender's
message-for instance, an advertising agency or a television station. The only possible difference
is that contributions involve an extra step in the proxy chain." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S.
604, 638-39 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)).
Additionally, Justice Thomas contended that after Buckley, the Court rejected the argument that
speech by proxy diminishes contributors speech rights in Federal Election Commission v.
National Conservative PoliticalAction Committee, 470 U.S. 480 (1985). See id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
216. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
217. See id. at 919-10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
218. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
219. See id. at 920 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas mentioned that political
candidates have a "strong self-interest" in using campaign contributions in the most efficient
means possible. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Such self-interest, Justice Thomas reasoned,
meant that "individual citizens understandably realize that they may add more to political
discourse by giving rather than spending, if the donee is able to put the funds to more productive
use than can the individual." See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Colorado Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 636 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)).
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mode of expressing their political ideas. 220 As a result, the Court's
decision allows the government to "second guess" the political
decisions of citizens, forcing donors to employ less effective means of
speech that prevents some contributors from speaking at all.2 2'
Therefore, Justice Thomas concluded that contribution limits impose a
speech and violate the First
substantial restriction on political
222
Amendment rights of contributors.
After analyzing the effects of contribution statutes on the free speech
of donors, Justice Thomas focused on their effect on rights on the
candidates. 223 Like the Court in Buckley, the majority in Shrink PAC III
allowed that contribution limits may constitute an infringement on the
free speech rights of individual candidates. 224 However, both opinions
found that the total effect of contribution limits on all candidates was
negligible, judging by the total amount given to fund political
225
campaigns.
Justice Thomas attacked this cumulative method of evaluating the
effect of contribution limits on the speech of candidates as "flawed and
unsupported," claiming that the First Amendment guarantees freedom
of speech to the individual.2 26 According to Justice Thomas, regardless
of the law's effect on candidates as a whole, the suppression of
individual political speech through contribution limits effectively dooms
some, if not most, minor candidates to political invisibility. 227 The

220. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (claiming that contribution limits "depriv[e] donors of
their right to speak through the candidate").
221. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argued that contribution limits served to
limit voter participation in the political process because forcing contributors to expend their time,
effort, and money disseminating political messages independently "may make the difference
between participating and not participating in some public debate." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 57 (1994)).
222. See id. at 917 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1976) (holding that expenditure limits imposed "substantial" restriction on speech while
contribution limits entail only a "marginal" restraint).
223. See Shrink PAC II1, 120 S. Ct. at 921 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
224. See id. at 909; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 33 (stating that "[contribution limits] may
have a significant effect on particular challengers or incumbents").
225. See Shrink PAC 111, 120 S. Ct. at 908; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. The district court
in Shrink PAC I cited figures indicating that overall contributions in Missouri had remained
relatively unchanged between the 1992 election, before state limits took effect, and the 1996
election. See Shrink PAC 1, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734, 740-41 (E.D. Mo. 1998), rev'd, 161 F.3d 519 (8th
Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000).
226. See Shrink PAC 111, 120 S. Ct. at 921-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe right to free
speech is a right held by each American, not by Americans en masse.").
227. See id. at 922 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the "clear and detrimental effect" of
contribution limits on candidates lacking "the advantages of incumbency, name recognition, or
substantial personal wealth").
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result is reduced political competition and less vigorous public
debate.22 8
After castigating what he termed the "analytic fallacies" in Buckley,
Justice Thomas warned that by failing to apply strict scrutiny to the
Missouri statute, the Court further eroded the already precarious
constitutional safeguards accorded political donations by the Buckley
opinion. 229 Justice Thomas accused the majority of applying a sui
generis standard of review to the Missouri contribution limits. 230 In
Justice Thomas' view, the majority's standard provided less
constitutional protection for political speech than Buckley because it
available to legislatures
expanded the compelling-interest justifications
231
seeking to limit political contributions.
Additionally, Justice Thomas warned that the majority's approach
loosened the requisite "narrow-tailoring" of speech-limiting laws by
sustaining a law containing broader restrictions than those upheld in
Buckley. 232 Rejecting the Missouri statute as "massively over
inclusive," Justice Thomas criticized the majority for neglecting to
address the law's other provisions that provide for lower contribution
limits, 233 equivalent limits for both individuals and political

228. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
229. See id. at 916 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of "weaken[ing] the already
enfeebled constitutional protection that Buckley afforded campaign contributions").
230. See id. at 922 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas observed that while the Buckley
Court purported to apply a test of "closest scrutiny" to FECA's contribution limits, it neglected to
do so in fact. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). He further noted that the majority opinion in
Shrink PAC III addressed the appropriate standard of review by referring only to "Buckley's
standard of scrutiny," which he labeled a sui generis test that resulted in an "ad hoc balancing
away of First Amendment rights." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Sui generis is defined as "[o]f its
own kind or class." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990). For a detailed discussion
of the Supreme Court's trend toward sui generis analysis in free speech cases, see Kraut, supra
note 33, at 177.
231. See Shrink PAC 111, 120 S. Ct. at 923 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Observing that Buckley
held only the prevention of quid pro quo corruption as a sufficiently compelling interest for
government limits on contributions, Justice Thomas argued that the majority's ruling redefined
corruption to include the broader concern of "politicians too compliant with the wishes of large
contributors." Id. at 924 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas worried that this language
allows "vague and unenumerated harms to suffice as a compelling reason for the government to
smother political speech." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
232. See id. at 924 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also 2 U.S.C. § 608(b) (West 1996 & Supp.
2000) (limiting individual contributions to $1000 per political candidate). In disagreeing with the
majority's view that the Missouri limits were narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest,
Justice Thomas disputed the Court's view that the state caps bore "a striking... resemblance to
the limitations sustained in Buckley," noting that inflation since the Buckley decision in 1976
rendered the state's limits more restrictive in scope than those previously approved by the Court.
Shrink PAC II1, 120 S. Ct. at 924 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
233. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 130.032.1(4) (West 1998) (limiting to $250 contributions to
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committees, 234 and vary contribution ceilings according to the
population of state districts. 235 Justice Thomas declared these measures
"crudely tailored" and unrelated to the state's interest in preventing
corruption.

236

Moreover, while conceding that Missouri's interest in preventing
corruption was compelling despite its lack of empirical evidence,
Justice Thomas claimed that less restrictive legislative means are
available to avert corruption, including anti-bribery laws and full
disclosure requirements. 237 Justice Thomas observed that where
"traditional legal methods" exist, the Supreme Court has ruled against
laws that suppress protected speech under the guise of crime
prevention. 238 Given the availability of such methods to Missouri and
all legislatures, Justice Thomas contended that government cannot pass
the equivalent of a statutory sledgehammer that crushes a large amount
of legitimate speech while also stamping out the possibility of
corruptive contributions. 239 As such, Justice Thomas concluded that the
state law at issue and contribution limits in general are an
unconstitutional abridgment of political speech.2 4 °

candidates for state representative).
234. See id. § 130.032.3 (imposing identical contribution limits on both political committees
and individuals).
235. See Shrink PAC III, 120 S. Ct. at 924-25 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Compare Mo. REV.
STAT. § 130.032.1(4) (limiting to $250 contributions to candidates from electoral districts with
populations of less than 100,000), with § 130.032.1(5) (limiting to $500 contributions to
candidates from electoral districts with populations of between 100,000 and 250,000).
236. See Shrink PAC 111, 120 S. Ct. at 924-25 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I cannot fathom how
a $251 contribution could pose a substantial risk of 'secur[ing] a political quid pro quo.' Thus,
contribution caps set at such levels could never be 'closely drawn."' (citation omitted)).
237. See id. at 926 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Missouri's contribution statute includes
disclosure requirements for candidates receiving contributions. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 130.041
(West 1998). Justice Thomas found that the only argument in favor of limiting contributions is
that such limits may be more effective in preventing corruption than other means available. See
Shrink PAC 111, 120 S. Ct. at 926 (Thomas, J., dissenting). However, he concluded that even if
contribution limits are more effective than other means, that does not justify silencing the speech
of contributors "without regard to whether the donors pose any real corruption risk." Id.
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
238. See Shrink PAC III, 120 S. Ct. at 926-27 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-49 (1943) (invalidating anti-burglary law that prohibited door-todoor distribution of political handbills); Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, Inc. 487 U.S. 781,
790 (1988) (invalidating regulation of fundraiser fees on grounds that state had already enacted
general antifraud law).
239. See Shrink PAC 111, 120 S. Ct. at 927 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("States are free to enact
laws that directly punish those engaged in corruption and require the disclosure of large
contributions, but they are not free to enact generalized laws that suppress a tremendous amount
of protected speech along with the targeted corruption.").
240. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).

236
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Court in Shrink PAC III reversed the Eighth Circuit and upheld
the Missouri contribution statute as constitutional, even though the
24 1
state's limitation amounts are far below those approved in Buckley.
The majority viewed the same concerns that led Congress to impose
contribution limits in 1974 as still valid to support state contribution
mirror the relative
statutes and further indicated that such laws need not
242
purchasing power of the limits approved in Buckley.
A. Contributionsand Expenditures:A Distinction Without a Difference
Unfortunately, the Court did not accept the judicial responsibility
inherent in the arena of government-imposed restrictions on political
speech. 243 Instead, the Court unquestionably adopted the defining
rationale of Buckley without pausing to assess its continued viability in
light of the nation's political experience during the last 25 years. 244 In
so doing, the majority opinion vastly understated the speechand the damage these laws
suppressing effects of contribution limits
245
wreak on the country's political debate.
The majority performed a disservice to the freedom of speech and the
democracy that depends on it by simply regurgitating Buckley's speech
by proxy distinction without further analysis. 246 Rather than mount its
own defense of Buckley's treatment of contribution speech as secondclass political speech, the majority merely block-quoted an entire
paragraph from that decision and thus sidestepped any serious
reconsideration of the issue. 247 Considering the importance of the
speech by proxy rationale in determining the constitutionality of
contribution limits, the majority's paltry discussion was an abdication of
the tension between government
its judicial responsibility to arbitrate
248
restrictions and personal freedoms.
241. See id.at 910.
242. See id. at 908 (stating that "there is little reason to doubt that sometimes large
contributions will work actual corruption of our political system, and no reason to question the
existence of a corresponding suspicion among voters").
243. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (stating that the First Amendment requires
"exacting scrutiny.").
244. See supra Part I1.D (discussing recent campaign financing developments).
245. See, e.g, Smith, supra note 8, at 1072 (arguing that campaign finance reform leads to
"undemocratic" consequences); Bopp, supra note 114, at 22 (noting that ideals that underlie
campaign finance reform proposals often go unfulfilled in practice).
246. See Shrink PAC 11, 120 S. Ct at 922 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority
opinion of "blindly adopt[ing]" Buckley's speech by proxy rationale).
247. See id. at 903-04.
248. Justice Kennedy categorized the majority's attitude toward the issue presented as
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As Justice Thomas' dissent forcefully argues, the speech by proxy
distinction is illogical in theory and untenable in practice. 249 This is
because most political messages depend upon mass media, and whether
funded by contributions or independent expenditures, the use of media
involves dissemination by third parties. 250 The bulk of modem political
advocacy is in the form of paid political advertisements, 25 1 requiring a
candidate to employ writers, editors, and other production personnel to
assist in transforming a political idea into political speech. Thus, there
is no viable constitutional distinction between contribution speech and
independent expenditure speech because both methods of
communication depend on a proxy for dissemination. 252 The majority
fails to acknowledge the twin nature of contributions and expenditures
in the political arena and therefore repeats Buckley's error in granting
contribution speech less than full First Amendment protection.
B. A Deferential Standardof Review
The Court in Shrink PAC III not only casually reaffirmed Buckley's
untenable contribution/expenditure distinction, but it lowered the
standard of review applicable to speech restrictions imposed by
contribution limits.
The majority opinion acknowledged that
contributions are an important source of political speech which, in turn,
should have triggered a strict scrutiny standard of review or standard
approaching it. 253 Yet where the Buckley Court at least paid lip service
to the strict scrutiny demanded by the First Amendment, the Shrink
PAC III majority did not bother to identify the level of scrutiny it
applied to Missouri's contribution statute. This ambiguity regarding the
appropriate standard of review exemplifies the Court's trend toward
254
individualized, sui generis review of free speech issues.
Far from the balancing approach urged by Justice Breyer, 255 the
Court's approach to analyzing state contribution limits more closely
"indifferent." See id. at 914 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
249. See id. at 918-21 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
250. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) ("[V]irtually every means of
communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.").
251. See Moramarco, supra note 47, at 109 n.10.
252. See Shrink PAC 111, 120 S. Ct. at 918 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that "[elven in the
case of a direct expenditure, there is usually some go-between that facilitates the dissemination of
the spender's message").
253. See id. at 917 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the Buckley Court claimed to employ
a strict scrutiny approach toward contribution limits but failed to do so in fact).
254. See Kraut, supra note 33, at 195-96 (arguing that free speech rights deserve more
consistent protection than provided by recent Supreme Court precedents).
255. See Shrink PAC 111, 120 S. Ct. at 912 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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resembles a rational-basis test, adopting a deferential posture to
Missouri's assertion of the law's necessity and function. 256 Rather than
requiring Missouri to introduce concrete evidence that corruption due to
political contributions was more than a problem in theory, the Court
simply recognized the reasonableness of the state's belief that large
257
contributions may lead to corruption or the appearance of corruption.
Ironically, the majority opinion stated that Missouri's evidentiary
burden may have increased had petitioners introduced more evidence of
their own to counteract examples of corruption cited in Buckley and
Shrink PAC 1.258 This assertion runs counter to precedent that places
the burden of justification upon the government seeking to restrict
freedom of speech and not upon the individual seeking to protect his
First Amendment rights.259 Moreover, the Court's decision effectively
ends the states' evidentiary burden of proving a compelling interest
behind contribution restrictions as state legislatures need now rely only
on the accounts of corruption contained in Buckley. 260 Consequently,
the Court established Buckley as evidentiary, as well as constitutional,
precedent for other state contribution laws, enshrining the electoral
misdeeds of the 1972 campaign as lasting proof of a compelling state
interest.
Unfortunately, the Court did not attempt an inquiry into whether the
Missouri statute was narrowly tailored to suit its avowed purpose, so as
to ensure that the law addressed only the corruptive influence of large
contributions while leaving political speech as unburdened as
256. Under a rational basis standard of review, a law need only have rational relation to a
legitimate state interest and must minimally advance that interest; no judicial consideration of less
restrictive means is pursued. See R. Randall Kelso, Considerations of Legislative Fit Under
Equal Protection,Substantive Due Process, and Free Speech Doctrine: SeparatingQuestions of
Advancement, Relationship andBurden, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1279, 1283 (1994).
257. See Shrink PAC II1, 120 S. Ct. at 906 ("Buckley demonstrates that the dangers of large,
corrupt contributions and the suspicion that large contributions are corrupt are neither novel nor
implausible.").
258. See id. at 908.
259. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (holding that the government did
not provide sufficient justification for removing war protest sign); United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171, 183 (1983); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716-17 (1977); see also Smith, supra
note 8, at 1057 (arguing that campaign finance reformers should bear burden of justifying
restrictions on free speech rights).
260. See Shrink PAC 111, 120 S. Ct. at 907. The Court held that although Missouri did not
introduce evidence to support its contention that corruption was a legitimate concern in state
government, newspaper reports of large contributions to the campaigns of certain state officials
and the passage of Proposition A was "enough to show that the substantiation of the
congressional concerns reflected in Buckley has its counterpart supporting the Missouri law." Id.
Moreover, the Court stated that Fredman and Shrink Missouri Government PAC had failed to
overcome "the apparent implications of Buckley's evidence." Id. at 908.
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possible. 26' The Court declined to examine the specific limitation
amounts chosen by the Missouri legislature to determine whether
higher, less speech-restrictive limits would be as effective in preventing
the appearance or reality of corruption. 262 Such a deferential stance
towards legislative solutions that infringe on "an area of the most
fundamental First Amendment activities" does not approach the
"rigorous scrutiny" mandated by Buckley. 263 As a result, state
legislatures may freely regulate campaign contributions at the most
advantageous level for the political establishment, with little or no
justification, regardless of the effects on protected speech or candidate
competition. 264 Consequently, the 265
Court's decision will mute public
dialogue and reduce electoral choice.
V.

IMPACT

The Court's decision in Shrink PAC III will have a lasting and
detrimental effect on political speech and electoral competition in
America. In sanctioning highly restrictive contribution limits like those
imposed under the Missouri statute, the Court set the stage for a
proliferation of more speech-suppressing legislation that will serve to
entrench establishment candidates and increase the power of the elite at
266
the expense of "ordinary" citizens.

261. The Court also did not discuss Justice Kennedy's suggestion to make use of the Internet's
disclosure of contributions as a less restrictive, and more efficient, means of policing corruption.
See id. at 915 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Internet's instant reporting and all-hours access
capabilities would seem ideal for this function. Perhaps not surprisingly, politicians are already
employing the Internet to solicit campaign contributions. See Joe Salkowski, Fund-raisingon
Net Levels Playing Fieldfor McCain, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 14, 2000, § 4, at 8 (discussing Senator's
McCain's use of the internet for fundraising).
262. See Shrink PAC III, 120 S. Ct. at 909.
263. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
264. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 8, at 1072 (arguing that lower contribution limits make
challenging incumbents more difficult); Gora, supra note 1, at 26-27 (arguing that contribution
limits primarily benefit incumbents and the wealthy).
265. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1072; Bopp, supra note 114, at 22. The majority dismissed
the state law's effect on Fredman's campaign as "a showing of one affected individual." Shrink
PAC I11, 120 S. Ct. at 909. However, the majority did not pause to consider the effect of
Fredman's inability to air his views on the content of the campaign in general. See, e.g.,
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 692 n.14 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[P]olitical figures outside the two major parties have been fertile sources of new
ideas and new programs.").
266. Although campaign finance reform, and contribution limits in particular, are billed as a
means to equalize the effects of wealth on the political process, some argue that a system of small
contributions tends to marginalize the collective voices of the many while enabling the wealthy
and influential to remain so. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1072-81.
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Beyond the immediate impact on the free speech rights of candidates
and their contributors, the Court's decision rewards and encourages the
political establishment to solidify their dominance over our country's
political debate and the electoral process. Granting state legislatures the
power to set contribution limits provides the incumbents with another
tool to limit political competition, thereby insulating themselves
from
267
challenge and steering electoral outcomes to their advantage.
The two major political parties already determine the rules for
candidates to gain ballot access. In many states, this fact has led 268
to
nearly insurmountable barriers to third-party or "outsider" candidates.
Additionally, the Supreme Court recently ruled that public television
broadcasters need not include third-party candidates in televised
debates, further limiting the public's exposure to alternative political
views. 269 These factors, together with the Court's ruling in Shrink PAC
III, will give the major parties the power to both control the level of
funding available to candidates outside the political mainstream and to
limit voter choice through ballot restrictions. Moreover, because minor
and independent candidates are not guaranteed access to televised
public debates, their public visibility may recede even further. 270 Thus,

267. See id. at 1072 (observing that contribution limits increase the difficulty for challengers
to wage an effective campaign against an incumbent); see also Deeley, supra note 92, at 552
(stating that "[i]ncumbent legislators have strong incentives ... to pass legislation that will
further advantage incumbents").
268. See Appleseed, supra note 109, at 453 (discussing the highly restrictive ballot access
laws of many states). Indeed, many states' ballot laws are so onerous that even major party
challengers have trouble meeting the access requirements. One recent example is Republican
presidential candidate John McCain, who despite a national profile and a 17-year Senate career
was not assured a spot on the March 7, 2000 New York primary ballot until after his victory in
the February 12, 2000 New Hampshire primary. A federal district court struck down New York's
byzantine ballot law, finding that it placed an "undue burden" on voters' First Amendment rights.
See Judge Korman's Election Order,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2000, at A14.
269. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v.Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998). In Forbes, the
Court held that a publicly-owned television station could exclude third-party candidates as long
as the exclusion was "reasonable" and not "based on the speaker's viewpoint." Id. at 682.
270. See Janet H. Brown, 15% Poll Rating Reasonable: Debates must focus on viable
candidates to serve their mission of informing public, KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIBUNE NEWS SERVICE,
Aug. 11, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service File.
The Commission on Presidential Debates, a private, nonprofit organization, has sponsored
debates among presidential and vice-presidential candidates since 1987 and sets the criteria for
candidate participation in a debate. See id. In determining if a candidate qualifies for a debate,
the Commission considers three factors: 1) whether a candidate is constitutionally eligible for
election; 2) whether the candidate has sufficient state ballot access to be mathematically eligible
for election; and 3) whether the candidate has a fifteen percent approval rating as determined by
the average of five national opinion polls. See id. It is this last criterion that tends to ensure that,
with infrequent exceptions, access to the forum of presidential debates is restricted to the
candidates of the two major parties. See id.
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the major political parties will increasingly control the terms of public
27 1
debate, to the detriment of our country's democratic process.
Ironically, this trend towards consolidation of political power in the
two major parties runs counter to the increasing political independence
among the public. 272 While such voter disaffection would seem to
indicate a desire for alternatives to the major parties, Shrink PAC III
leads to less vigorous political debate, fewer candidate choices, and a
solidification of major party dominance of the electorate. Given that
third parties historically have been the impetus for many progressive
political ideas that were later adopted by the mainstream, 273 the Court's
reaffirmation that contribution speech is undeserving of full First
Amendment protection lands a heavy blow to the type of grassroots
274
activity that has historically powered this nation's political process.
VI. CONCLUSION

In upholding Missouri's campaign contribution limits, the Supreme
Court in Shrink PAC III reiterated the viability of the constitutional
distinction articulated in Buckley, which divided contributions and
expenditures into separate constitutional categories for purposes of First
Amendment analysis. Moreover, the Court sanctioned the use of the
Buckley opinion as evidentiary proof by governments seeking to enforce
contribution statutes, excusing the need to produce current empirical
evidence that corruption due to political contributions is more than a
theoretical threat. As a result, the Court's decision has reduced the level
of judicial scrutiny applicable to legislative restrictions on First
Amendment freedoms. In the process, the Court has restricted
contributors' freedom of speech, reduced candidate competition, and
generally stunted the health of the nation's political debate.

271. Ironically, the Buckley Court itself noted that "[i]n a republic where the people are
sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is
essential." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976). Unfortunately, the Court's decision in
Shrink PAC III will likely work to reduce voter choice by narrowing candidate options.
272. See Appleseed, supra note 109, at 454 (noting that a record number of voters in 1998 did
not declare themselves members of either major political party).
273. See id. at 455 (crediting third parties with the enactment of child-labor laws, the eighthour workday, female suffrage, farmer assistance programs, and the graduated income tax).
274. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1082-84 (arguing that regulating campaign funding tends to
"professionalize" politics to the detriment of the average citizen).

